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INTERPRETING THE EQUAL PAY ACT:
CORNING GLASS WORKS v. BRENNAN
Brian Douglas Baird
The United States Supreme Court in Corning Glass Works v.
Brennan' handed down its first decision under the Equal Pay Act of
1973. In finding that Coming Glass had violated the Equal Pay Act,
the Court gave substance to the Act, bolstered the vital goal of equal
pay for equal work, and further chiseled the Act's rough outline.
This note will proceed from a section detailing the background
and essential elements of the Equal Pay Act, to an analysis of the partic-
ular issues of Corning Glass Works v. Brennan. Finally, the Court's
reasoning will be discussed with a view toward pinpointing the future
impact of this significant decision.
In Corning Glass Works v. Brennan the Supreme Court consoli-
dated two cases which had resulted in a direct conflict between the Sec-
ond2 and Third Circuits.3 The case which came from the Second Cir-
cuit involved Coming plants located in Coming, New York, while the
case from the Third Circuit involved a Coming plant in Wellsboro,
Pennsylvania. The Secretary of Labor brought both of these cases to
enjoin Coming from violating the Equal Pay Act and to collect back
wages allegedly due female inspectors because of past violations. The
history of Coming's employment practices in regard to the particular
job of inspector will help to focus the precise issues present in this case.
In 1930, when Corning originally instituted a night shift, the state
laws in Pennsylvania and in New York prohibited women from work-
ing at night.4 Though women had previously worked as inspectors dur-
ing the day shift, it became necessary for Corning to hire male employ-
1. 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
2. 474 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1973).
3. 480 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1973).
4. New York prohibited the employment of women between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.
Pennsylvania prohibited them from working between midnight and 6 a.m.
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ees for these positions at night. Men, predominantly recruited from
the day shift, received substantially higher base wages for transferring
to the night shift, though all other job categories received equal pay
for either day or night shift. Even after a 1944 labor agreement set
up a plant-wide shift differential creating a set premium for everyone
on the night shift, the male inspectors at night continued to receive sub-
stantially higher base wages than the women day shift inspectors and
at a rate in excess of the established premium.
Coming made no effort to alleviate this discriminatory wage situa-
tion until June 1966, though the state laws were amended years before
to allow women to work at night,5 and though the Equal Pay Act de-
manding such an effort became effective in 1964.
In June 1966 Coming finally offered jobs to women as inspectors
on the night shift. Women were allowed to compete for these positions
on an equal footing with men and for equal pay.
The next move made to comply with the Equal Pay Act took place
in January 1969 when a new collective-bargaining agreement estab-
lished a uniform job evaluation system which resulted in a wage equal-
ization for both sexes doing equal work. This equalization plan, while
eliminating discriminatory wages between men and women inspectors,
provided for an important exception. This exception established a
higher "red circle" base rate to be paid to inspectors hired for the night
shift prior to the date of the labor agreement in 1969.
In Corning Glass the Supreme Court dealt with the primary issue:
did Corning Glass Works violate the Equal Pay Act by paying higher
base wages to male night shift inspectors than it paid to female day
shift inspectors doing equal work. Complementary issues involved the
adequacy of Coming's corrective measures in 1966 and in 1969.
The Court, in affirming the decision of the Second Circuit, held
that Corning had violated the Equal Pay Act through its sexually dis-
criminatory wage policies; furthermore, the corrective measures which
Corning had implemented years after the effective date of the Act were
found wanting. Since these half-hearted schemes failed to fulfill the
equalization requirement of the Act, the Court held that the violations
continued unabated. This decision lead to an injunction and to an esti-
mated one million dollar back pay settlement.
5. Law of March 30, 1927, ch. 453, [1927] N.Y. Laws 1131 (repealed 1953); Law
of April 28, 1930, ch. 868, [1930] N.Y. Laws 1625 (repealed 1953).
[Vol. 10:681
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EQUAL PAY ACT
The Federal Equal Pay Act was enacted June 10, 1963.6 It
added subsection (d) to section 6 of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
The Act, in relevant part, states:
(1) No employer having employees subject to any pro-
visions of this section shall discriminate, within any establish-
ment in which such employees are employed, between em-
ployees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in
such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he
pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such estab-
lishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which
requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are
performed under similar working conditions, except where
such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii)
a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by
quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based
on any other factor other than sex: Provided, That an em-
ployer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation of
this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the provi-
sions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any em-
ployee.7
The purpose of the Act is clearly set forth in the legislation's "Dec-
laration of Purpose."" There, the existence of wage differentials based
6. Department of Labor bulletins relevant to the Equal Pay Act. 29 C.F.R. §§
800.100-800.163 (1974).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970). The remainder of the statute follows:
(2) No labor organization, or its agents, representing employees of an
employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall cause
or attempt to cause such an employer to discriminate against an employee in
violation of paragraph (1) of this subsection.
(3) For purposes of administration and enforcement, any amounts owing
to any employee which have been withheld in violation of this subsection shall
be deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation
under this chapter.
(4) As used in this subsection, the term "labor organization" means any
organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee
or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in
whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor dis-
putes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.
8. The Equal Pay Act of 1963 provided that:
(a) The Congress hereby finds that the existence in industries engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce of wage differentials
based on sex-
(1) depresses wages and living standards for employees necessary for
their health and efficiency;
(2) prevents the maximum utilization of the available labor resources;(3) tends to cause labor disputes, thereby burdening, affecting, and ob-
structing commerce;(4) burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; and
(5) constitutes an unfair method of competition.(b) It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Act, through exercise by
Congress of its power to regulate commerce among the several States and with
foreign nations, to correct the conditions above referred to in such industries.
Pub. L. No. 88-38, 2, 77 Stat. 56.
19751
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on sex was found to depress employee wages and living standards nec-
essary for health and efficiency; to prevent maximum utilization of
available labor resources; to cause labor disputes thereby burdening
and obstructing commerce; to impede the free flow of goods in com-
merce; and to constitute an unfair method of competition. Clearly the
sponsors of the Act viewed the concept of equal pay for equal work
as an essential tenet of commercial stability and found the effects of
wage discrimination to be profound, causing a dramatic detrimental im-
pact on a major share of the nation's labor force and substantially bur-
dening our system of commerce.9
Courts which have interpreted and fleshed out the Equal Pay Act
have given fuller breadth and meaning to the Act's purpose. In Shultz
v. Wheaton Glass Co.'° the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit en-
visaged the Equal Pay Act as a broad charter of women's rights in the
economic field. The court in Shultz v. First Victoria National Bank"
found that an important purpose of the Act was to eliminate traditional
stereotyped misconceptions regarding the value of women's work.
Focusing on the Act as a remedy for discrimination, Justice Mar-
shall in Corning Glass found that the purpose of the Act was to remedy
our nation's entire wage structure; a structure based on the outmoded
view that a man, because of his role in society, should be paid more
than a woman though their duties are the same.
A number of courts have mentioned the stereotyped misconcep-
tions which have contributed to the perpetuation of wage discrimination
in the United States. Recent statistics show that an unequal wage struc-
ture continues to exist and flourish today, despite evidence that women
now are a permanent part of the work force.
Nearly 35 million women are in the labor force today, represent-
ing over 36 percent of the total labor force. More than 50 percent
of all women between 18 and 64 years of age are in the labor force
and they work for exactly the same reasons men do.12 The clear ma-
jority of women work for compelling economic reasons, and are as re-
liable' 3 and as stable as men workers.' 4
9. S. REP. No. 176, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1963).
10. 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.s. 905 (1970).
11. 420 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1969).
12. Figures are from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census and
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
13. Exploding the myth that women are paid less because they are more unreliable
and unstable, "[a] recent Public Health Service study shows little difference in the ab-
[Vol. 10: 681
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EQUAL PAY ACT
Though women workers contribute equal value they are paid
less.r Among all workers, women's median earnings were only three-
fifths those of men in 1971. While this statistic fails accurately to re-
flect the comparative difference in compensation received by men and
women who invest the same amount of skill, time and effort in their
vocations, the Council of Economic Advisors to the President has esti-
mated that a differential of approximately 20 percent between the
earnings of men and women remains after adjusting for factors such
as education, work experience during the year, and lifelong work ex-
perience.
In continuing now to examine the operation of the Equal Pay Act,
it should be noted that the coverage provided by the Act is limited
to those employees otherwise covered by the Fair Labor Standards
Act.'6 Generally, to be covered an employee or enterprise must be
engaged in commerce or produce goods for commerce.' 7  Most busi-
ness coverage attaches only where annual business volume is at a
500,000 dollar level.'
Remedies available under the Act include aggrieved employee
suits and injunctive actions brought by the Secretary of Labor, with
sentee rate due to illness or injury between men and women: 5.6 days a year for women
compared with 5.2 days for men." WomEN's BuRFAU, EMPLOYM.NT STANDARDS
ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LAB oR, 0-550-114 (1974).
14. Studies on labor turnover indicate that net differences for men and women are
generally small. In manufacturing industries the 1968 rates of accessions per 100 em-
ployees were 4.4 for men and 5.3 for women; the respective separation rates were 4.4
and 5.2. U.S. Gov'T PRINTING OFFICE, The Myth and the Reality, (1974).
15. Figures from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census and U.S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics indicate that median wage or salary
incomes of year-round full-time women workers in selected major occupation groups in
1971 were as follows:
As percent of
Major Occupation group Income men s income
Professional and technical workers $8,346 69
Nonfarm managers and administrators 7,312 56
Clerical workers 5,718 62
Sales workers 4,549 43
Operatives, including transport 4,798 61
Service Workers (except private household) 4,280 60
16. As of July 1, 1972, the protection of the Equal Pay Act was extended to execu-
tive, administrative, and professional employees and to outside sales personnel, who had
previously been exempt from coverage. For example, all employees of educational insti-
tutions, public and private, are now protected by the Act, as are nonsupervisory and man-
agerial employees in most other organizations and industries. Among the few categories
still unprotected are certain public employees and employees in small retail or service
establishments.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1970).
18. 1 CCH LAB. L. REp. Wages and Hours 24,901 (1974).
1975]
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criminal penalties provided for willful violators. 19 An aggrieved em-
ployee may sue for back wages, plus an additional sum up to the
amount of the back wages, plus attorneys' fees and costs.
It is important to observe that relief from wage discrimination can
also be sought under the provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and its enforcement machinery. While the scope of the Civil
Rights Act is broader than that of the Equal Pay Act, these statutes
work together. Section 2000e-2(h) of Title VII provides that it is a law-
ful employment practice for an employer to discriminate on the basis
of sex in fixing wages if such differentiation is not prohibited by the
provisions of the Equal Pay Act.
The test for the application of the Equal Pay Act was succinctly
set out by the Court in Corning Glass. In an action enforcing the pro-
visions of the Equal Pay Act, the Secretary of Labor has the burden
of proving that an employer paid an unequal wage to employees of op-
posite sexes for equal work at jobs which require equal skill, effort,
and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working
conditions.20
Once the Secretary has carried his burden of proof it shifts to the
employer to establish that the differential in wages was justified under
any one of the Act's four exceptions.2' A differential is permissible if
it is shown to be based on a valid seniority system, a merit system, a
system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production,
or a differential based on any factor other than sex.
In both of the circuit court cases combined in Corning Glass, the
Secretary of Labor asserted that he had fulfilled his burden of proof-
that employees of opposite sexes were being paid different wages for
equal work. The Secretary further maintained that Coming had not
shown that its actions fit under any of the exceptions to the Act.
Corning's principal argument provided that the inspectors' jobs
during the night, in contrast to the same jobs during the day, were not
performed under similar working conditions. If this assertion could be
established there would be no violation of the Equal Pay Act.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1970); 29 C.F.R. 800.166(b) (1974).
20. Hodgson v. Coming Glass Works, 474 F.2d 226, 231 (2d Cir. 1973); Brennan
v. Coming Glass Works, 480 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1973). See also Hodgson v. Behrens
Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041, 1049 (5th Cir. 1973); Hodgson v. Golden Isles Convalescent
Homes, Inc., 468 F.2d 1256, 1257 (5th Cir. 1972).
21. See 474 F.2d at 231, n. 10; 480 F.2d at 1258, n. 10; Hodgson v. Robert Hall
Clothes, Inc., 473 F.2d 589, 597 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973);
Hodgson v. Security Nat'1 Bank, 460 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1972).
[Vol. 10:681
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The central point of disagreement between the circuits was the
proper interpretation of the phrase "similar working conditions." For,
if a difference in work shift prevents two otherwise equal jobs from
being considered "equal work"22 within the definition of the Equal Pay
Act, then the Secretary would be unable to establish a violation of the
Act under the facts of the Corning Glass case.
The Third Circuit believed, as did Coming, that shift differences
made the jobs unequal because they were not performed under "simi-
lar working conditions;" therefore it was the Secretary's burden to prove
that night and day shift jobs were performed under similar conditions.
In support of its contention, the Third Circuit stressed the importance
of a quote made by Congressman Goodell, an Act sponsor, who main-
tained that a difference of shift would fall within the Act's "working
condition" factor.2 3 The appeals court found that the Secretary had
failed to carry his burden of proof in this regard and decided the case
in favor of Coming without further discussion.
The Second Circuit, in contrast, found that the presence of differ-
ent work shifts did not create a problem of proof for the Secretary un-
der the "working condition" element of the Act. Rather, the court indi-
cated, as had a House Committee report on the subject,24 that a shift
differential question should be included in the fourth broad exception
category, "differentials based on any other factor other than sex," and
was thus a matter to be proven by Coming. Specifially, Coming would
have had to prove that the higher base wage of male night inspectors
was in fact based on any factor other than sex.
The Supreme Court supported the Second Circuit's interpretation
of the Act's language. The Court also found that Coming had failed
to meet its burden of proving that its higher pay for men inspectors
was based on any variable other than sex.25 In fact, the Court main-
tained that the pay scales instituted by Coming Glass reflected a labor
market in which Corning could pay women less for the same work.
Coming's motivation was fairly simple the Court postulated: since they
could pay less to women they did.
To help further define the pivotal term "working conditions" the
Court explored the reasons behind the use of this particular language.
The Court found that Congress' definition of the general term "equal
22. See Annot., 7 A.L.R. Fed. 707, 717 (1971).
23. 109 CoNG. REc. 9209 (1973).
24. H.R. REP. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1963).
25. 417 U.S. at 205.
19751
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work" came from its response to the desires of business and from job
evaluation plans utilized by industry.2 6 In Congress' attempt to put
bona fide job differences outside the scope of the Act, certain technical
words were used which, the Supreme Court asserted, must be inter-
preted in the language of industrial relations. The phrase "working
conditions" viewed in this manner, and as defined by the Wage and
Hour Administration, does not refer to the time of day a job is per-
formed. 7
After determining that the Secretary had met his burden by show-
ing that Coming had violated the Equal Pay Act through its wage policy
for day and night shift inspectors, the Court went on to find that this
violation was not cured by Corning's subsequent actions in 1966 and
later in 1969.
The Supreme Court forcefully argued that a violation of the Equal
Pay Act could only be cured by complete equalization. The Court as-
serted that complete equalization was not achieved by Corning's effort
in 1966 to open up higher paid night positions to women, nor was it
achieved by the labor agreement in 1969 which retained higher base
wages for former night inspectors. The "red circle" base wage dif-
ferential was found to perpetuate former wage discrimination and failed
to cure Coming's violation of the Equal Pay Act.
The Court also defined the proviso of the Act which states that
compliance with the Act can not be accomplished by reducing the wage
rate of any employee.2 Supporting the interpretations of other courts,
the Supreme Court declared that a violation of the Act can only be rem-
edied by raising the lower wages to the level of the higher wages. The
Court asserted:
The whole purpose of the Act was to require that these de-
pressed wages be raised, in part as a matter of simple justice
to the employees themselves, but also as a matter of market
economics, since Congress recognized as well that discrimi-
nation in wages on the basis of sex "constitutes an unfair
method of competition. 29
26. Hearings on Equal Pay Act of 1963 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the S.
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., at 96-104 (1963); Hearings
on Equal Pay Act Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Edt-
cation and Labor, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., at 304-308 (1963).
27. See Bimnrm, WAGE AND SALARY ADm, usrTIM oN 271-74, 287-89 (1955); U.S.
DFP'T OF LABOR, DiCTONARY OF OcCUPATONAL TimEs 656 (3d ed. 1965).
28. H.R. RP. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1963).
29. 417 U.S. at 207.
[Vol. 10: 681
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It was thus made clear that no half-way measure will do; only complete
equalization of wages at the higher level will operate to cure a violation
of the Equal Pay Act.
The Supreme Court's decision in Corning Glass Works v. Brennan
will have significant impact on the future interpretation and application
of the Equal Pay Act of 1973. The final million dollar settlement for
back wages stands as a symbol of the Act's vitality and scope.
The Court's definition of the phrase "working conditions" will
close one avenue of potential dispute and will aid in subsequent inter-
pretation of the Act. More importantly, the Supreme Court has set an
example with regard to the determination of what is "equal work."
Where an employer utilizes a bona fide industrial job evaluation plan,
the Court noted, this plan should be used as a guide to determine if
certain jobs are "equal" for the purposes of the Equal Pay Act. With
such a plan as a backdrop, the Court continued, an employer could not
assert that jobs equal under the plan were unequal for purposes of the
Act merely by claiming some extraneous difference in conditions or be-
cause of some small extra effort or responsibility.
By stressing complete equalization as the only acceptable remedy
for wage disparity under the Equal Pay Act, the Court has set an ex-
ample which, if followed, will lead to the demise of the half-way meas-
ures so often used in the past to thwart the true thrust of the Act. No
longer will a company be allowed to disguise sexual discrimination b,
the use of "neutral factors" other than sex (e.g., the "red circle" de-
vice) to perpetuate past violations. In addition, the Court's decision
should restrain the increasing litigation in this area of the law by clari-
fying the requirements of the Equal Pay Act and by stressing that the
purpose of the Act is not to be narrowly drawn but rather is broadly
remedial in character.
The Equal Pay Act and the Supreme Court's interpretation thereof
stand as monuments to the principle of equal pay for equal work-a
principle cast in the steel logic; an idea powerfully furthering the Mu-
sive pursuit of sexual equality.
19751
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